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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred by ruling that even when 
a contract of employment for a definite term is established an 
employer has no burden to show justification for discharge? Ong 
Int'l (USA) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 
1993)(legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness and afforded 
no deference). Issue preserved in the trial court in Plaintiff's 
Trial Brief at R.984 
2. Whether the trial court erred by ruling that "refusal" 
to perform in the context of the Agreement is synonymous with 
"failure" to perform? Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. 
Ross, 849 P. 2d 1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1992) (interpretation of 
unambiguous contract presents question of law and thus is 
reviewed for correctness and accorded no deference). Issue 
preserved in the trial court in the Joint Pretrial Order at 
R.1039. 
3. Whether some of the trial court's written and oral 
Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous because (a) the Findings 
are supported only by unsubstantiated allegations; (b) the 
Findings are contrary to the great weight of the evidence; (c) 
the Findings were induced by an erroneous view of the law; or (d) 
the Appellate Court is definitely and firmly convinced that a 
mistake has been made? Western Capital & Securities, Inc. v. 
Knudsvig, 768 P. 2d 989 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (factual findings 
reviewed under clearly erroneous standard). 
4. Whether the trial court erred by ruling that the 
Heritage Employee Handbook was not part of the contractual 
employment relationship between the parties? Ong Int'l, supra, 
(question of law reviewed for correctness and accorded no 
deference). Issue preserved in trial court in Pretrial Order at 
R.1039. 
5. Whether the trial court erred by failing to hold 
Heritage Imports liable to Kraatz for wrongful termination as a 
matter of law where Heritage Imports was required by the Heritage 
Employee Handbook to give Kraatz a written warning for 
unsatisfactory performance, but failed to do so prior to Kraatz's 
discharge? Equitable Life, supra, (question of law reviewed for 
correctness and accorded no deference). Issue preserved in trial 
court in Pretrial Order at R.1038. 
6. Whether the trial court erred by failing to award 
Kraatz health benefits and stock appreciation rights which vested 
prior to his discharge? Equitable Life, supra, (question of law 
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reviewed for correctness and accorded no deference). Issue 
preserved in trial court in Pretrial Order at R.1037-38. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
R u l e 3 0 1 , UTAH R. E V I D . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a wrongful termination case based on a written 
Employment Agreement (the "Agreement") between William Anthony 
"Tony" Kraatz ("Kraatz"), as employee, and Heritage Imports, a 
Utah corporation ("Heritage"), as employer, for a five-year term, 
under which Heritage's right to discharge Kraatz was limited to 
the following causes: (1) fraud; (2) dishonesty; (3) refusal by 
Kraatz to fulfill his employment responsibilities; or (4) 
Kraatz's disability. (App. B-Exh. 38.) 
After a bench trial, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
entered a judgment of no cause of action (R.1718-20) concluding, 
inter alia, that "there is no burden upon Defendants to prove 
that the discharge of Plaintiff was justified" (R.1703) and that 
"failure" is the same as "refusal" in the context of the 
Agreement. (R.1710.) Kraatz timely commenced this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Heritage was a family-owned corporation whose main asset was 
an automobile dealership located in Murray, Utah (the 
"Dealership"). (R.1683.) O. Bryan Wilkinson ("B. Wilkinson") was 
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the major shareholder of Heritage until April 1993, when he sold 
his stock to Larry H. Miller ("Miller"). Id. Miller took over 
operation of the Dealership as of December 9, 1992. (Management 
Agreement dated December 9, 1992, App. B-Exh. 53, R.2200.) 
B. Wilkinson's children, J. Wilkinson, Lynlee Wilkinson, 
Wendy Gorringe and Matt Wilkinson, were all officers, directors 
and minority shareholders of Heritage. J. Wilkinson and Matt 
Wilkinson were also managers at the Dealership. (R.1683-84, 1783-
84, 1793, 1811-12, 1824.) Jeff Gorringe, Wendy's husband, was 
also employed at the Dealership as a manager. (R.1784, 1950.) 
Prior to accepting employment at Heritage Imports in the 
spring of 1990, Kraatz was an owner and the General Manager of 
Anthony Wade, Inc., a successful automobile dealership in St. 
George, Utah. Kraatz had 25 years experience in the automobile 
industry and enjoyed a good reputation as a general manager. 
(R.1748, 1746-47, 1923, 2091-92.) 
In the spring of 1990, B. Wilkinson asked Kraatz whether he 
would be interested in becoming the General Manager of the 
Dealership. (R.1685, 1871.) B. Wilkinson knew Kraatz "quite well" 
and considered Kraatz to be a very good General Manager. (R.1871, 
1922-23, App. B-Exh. 58.) B. Wilkinson told Kraatz that he wanted 
to remove himself from day-to-day involvement with the Dealership 
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and that the Dealership was not doing as well as he would like. 
(R.1685.) 
Before Kraatz accepted employment with Heritage, Kraatz was 
advised by Jeff Gorringe, and was otherwise made aware, that it 
would be difficult for him to control B. Wilkinson's exorbitant 
spending of dealership money (R.1686, 1864, 2456). But B. 
Wilkinson promised to limit his compensation from the Dealership 
to $15,000.00 per month if Kraatz would agree to become General 
Manager. (R.1822-23, 1925.) 
B. Wilkinson also warned Kraatz that B. Wilkinson's children 
would be resentful of Kraatz's position in the Dealership 
(R.1941) and that he expected that J. Wilkinson (also called 
"J.J.") "would be tough" to train, but thought that Kraatz could 
teach him and train him. (R.1820.) J. Wilkinson did in fact 
express disappointment that Kraatz had been hired as General 
Manager, but B. Wilkinson assured J. Wilkinson that Kraatz's 
employment would be for "a short time" and that J. Wilkinson 
would then become the general manager or dealer of the 
Dealership. (R.2349-50.) 
The Agreement, prepared by Heritage's counsel and executed 
in May of 1990, provides that Heritage could terminate Kraatz's 
employment only for fraud, dishonesty, refusal by Kraatz to 
fulfill the employment responsibilities described in the 
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Agreement, or Kraatz's disability to the extent he was unable to 
perform his contractual duties. (App. B—Exh. 38.) The parties 
agreed upon these termination provisions after Kraatz explained 
to B. Wilkinson that he needed a contract that "basically 
couldn't be ended" and that he "wanted to make sure that the 
reasons that [he] could be let go or cancel the contract were 
very specific." (R.1762-63.) 
Kraatz's testimony was uncontroverted that there were no 
reasons discussed for which Kraatz could be "let go" other than 
those set forth in the Agreement. B. Wilkinson did not dispute 
Kraatz's testimony, but testified that he did not remember 
discussing any specific profit level that Kraatz was expected to 
attain (R.2020), and that the Agreement was written as concisely 
as possible regarding the parties' respective duties. (R.2027.) 
The Agreement required Kraatz to contribute "his best 
professional skill to perform the services at all times for the 
business and benefit of the company," to "devote his full and 
exclusive time to perform the services" required of him as 
General Manager, and to " [p]rovide management training" to 
persons selected by Heritage. (App. B—Exh. 38.) In return, the 
Agreement promised that Kraatz would have "authority over all 
aspects of the daily operations" of the Dealership and that 
Kraatz would be "consulted on all items of long-range planning 
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relating to the dealership." (App. B—Exh. 38; Management Chart, 
App. B—Exh. 324, showing relative authority of managerial staff.) 
Kraatz's employment with Heritage Imports commenced on June 
1, 1990, and continued until September 11, 1992. (R.1687.) The 
Dealership was not as profitable during Kraatz's tenure as he had 
hoped. (R.1690.) In 1990 it lost $295,515.00; in 1991 it realized 
a profit of only $5,169.00; and in 1992 it lost $124,980.00. 
(R.1690.) However, it did not lose money in 1992 until after 
Kraatz was fired. (R.2220; Fin. Stats., App. B-Exh. 297, Bates 
Nos. 189, 193, 197, 201 and 205, item 63 of each Fin. Stat.) 
While Kraatz and B. Wilkinson had many discussions 
concerning profitability, B. Wilkinson did not blame Kraatz for 
losses suffered by the Dealership. (R.1690, 1863, 2029.) B. 
Wilkinson admitted that the loss in 1990 "wasn't [all] Tony's 
fault," took some responsibility for losses suffered in 1992, and 
admitted that Kraatz had "tried to operate the store in a 
profitable fashion." (R.2000-01, 2031.) 
At the time of Kraatz's employment, Heritage had various 
loans with Comerica Bank, including a $3,000,000 flooring loan 
for new cars, and had guaranteed a loan to Goodworks, a 
partnership controlled by B. Wilkinson. (R.1691, 1885-86, 2000; 
App. B-Exh. 275 at pp. 1-2). These loans were secured in part by 
Heritage's used car inventory, and were cross-collateralized and 
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cross-defaulted. (R.1691, 1958, 2050.) In addition to its 
Comerica financing, Heritage had a used car flooring line with 
Key Bank, obtained in 1989, in the amount of $800,000.00, which 
was also collateralized by Heritage's used car inventory. 
(R.1956-58, 1963 . ) 
In late 1990, Kraatz and B. Wilkinson discussed increasing 
the used car flooring with Key Bank from $800,000.00 to 
$2,000,000.00. B. Wilkinson agreed with Kraatz's decision to 
increase the used car flooring with Key Bank and ultimately 
executed the documents effecting the change. (R.1960-65.) 
B. Wilkinson and Kraatz also discussed obtaining new car 
flooring from local banks. (R.2039-40.) B. Wilkinson eventually 
executed the documents opening the new car flooring line with Key 
Bank. (R.1965-66.) By letter dated December 18, 1990, Kraatz 
officially advised Dan Hartmann (wHartmann"), Comerica's banking 
officer in charge of the Heritage loans, of Heritage's decision 
to change its new car flooring line to Key Bank. (App. B-Exh. 
501.) In response, Hartmann notified B. Wilkinson by letter dated 
January 11, 1991, that the Goodworks Partnership loan was 
contingent on the Dealership maintaining floor plan financing 
with Comerica. (R.2047; App. B-Exh. 504.) B. Wilkinson responded 
to Hartmann's threat by letter dated January 22, 1991, wherein B. 
Wilkinson referenced his previous conversations with Hartmann 
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regarding Heritage's decision to seek local financing and 
requested Comerica's cooperation. (App. B-Exh. 266.) The 
financing arrangements between Heritage and Comerica were 
ultimately modified, resulting in extra payment by Heritage to 
Comerica of over $100,000.00. (R.2040, 2048; App. B-Exh. 275.) 
The Comerica flooring line was paid off in late 1991. (R.2060.) 
Kraatz understood that he was to provide management training 
to B. Wilkinson's children as part of his responsibilities under 
the Agreement. Kraatz believed that J. Wilkinson was "most 
logically going to be the dealer," although Heritage never 
formally designated whom Kraatz was to train. (R.1782-84.) B. 
Wilkinson admitted that Kraatz tried to train the children, but 
"just didn't get the job done" and that the training "just did 
not happen." (R.1877, 2041.) Kraatz also testified that he tried 
to train B. Wilkinson's children. (R.1794-95.) 
During Kraatz's employment, he worked 50-60 hours per week 
at the Dealership. He worked week days, and some Saturdays, and 
also at home after hours. He had no employment outside the 
Dealership. (R.1770-71.) 
On or about September 7, 1992, B. Wilkinson asked J. 
Wilkinson to prepare a work schedule for Kraatz to include some, 
but not all, Saturdays and evenings. (R.1809-11, 1937-1938, 2362-
63.) J. Wilkinson was Kraatz's subordinate; he had never prepared 
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a work schedule for Kraatz before, although he had prepared 
schedules for others under Kraatz's direction. (R.1809-11, 1937-
39.) 
J. Wilkinson prepared a work schedule which required Kraatz 
to work every Saturday between September 6 and October 17, 1992. 
(App. B-Exh. 1; R.2362.) When J. Wilkinson presented the schedule 
to Kraatz, Kraatz responded that he could not work all of the 
Saturday and evenings on the schedule and that he would prepare a 
schedule for J. Wilkinson and himself to work. (R.2363-69.) J. 
Wilkinson refused to accept the schedule prepared by Kraatz. 
(App. B-Exh. 2; R.1811.) 
On September 11, 1992, B. Wilkinson asked for Kraatz's 
resignation. (R.1771-72, 1875-76.) B. Wilkinson testified that he 
very briefly told Kraatz he was terminating him for u[l]ack of 
profitability, inability to teach my children what he'd agreed 
to, and not always leveling with me on certain accounts, titles 
in, overage used cars and such." (R.1876-77.) B. Wilkinson 
admitted that no date, time or circumstance of any specific 
instance of "refusal" or "dishonesty" was described; in fact, 
very little detail was given. (R.1876.) B. Wilkinson did not 
follow the scheme of progressive discipline set forth in the 
Heritage Employee Handbook. It was uncontroverted at trial that 
there was no prior written reprimand or warning in Kraatz's 
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employee file. (R.1780, 1951.) Kraatz also testified that the 
September 11 meeting was very short and that the only reason B. 
Wilkinson gave for asking for Kraatz's resignation was that he 
didn't want Kraatz to be between him and his children. (R.1772.) 
B. Wilkinson later came up with additional reasons for 
terminating Kraatz's employment, including allegedly "refusing" 
to work the schedule prepared by J. Wilkinson, and allegedly 
"unilaterally" changing the flooring. However, B. Wilkinson's 
reasons were simply pretexts for terminating Kraatz's employment. 
A few days after Kraatz was fired, J. Wilkinson became president 
and chief operating officer of the Dealership. (App. B-Exh. 5.) 
In December 1992, B. Wilkinson concluded negotiations with 
Miller for the sale of his stock. (R.2186.) Miller immediately 
infused $800,000.00 in new capital into the Dealership in the 
form of cash, implemented his own policies and procedures, and 
made and implemented decisions independent of B. Wilkinson. 
(R.2076, 2086-87, 2418-19.) Within a few months, Miller invested 
an additional $600,000.00 to expand Heritage's used car lot. 
(R.2083-84.) Even so, the Dealership lost $32,569.00 in 1993, but 
did realize net profits of $323,002.00 and $942,071.00 for the 
years 1994 and 1995, respectively. (App. B-Exhs. 208 and 333.) 
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After Kraatz was fired, he was hired by the Rick Warner 
Automobile Group (uWamerff) and at the time of trial was General 
Manager of the Warner Nissan dealership. (R.1746.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court made several critical errors of law at 
trial. Initially, contrary to well-settled law, the court made 
the startling ruling that Heritage had no burden to establish 
that Kraatz's discharge was justified under the terms of the 
Agreement. Kraatz is entitled to a presumption that he is honest, 
competent and loyal to his employer. This presumption is outcome 
determinative unless rebutted by credible probative evidence of 
legally sufficient quantity and quality; conclusory allegations 
are insufficient to meet the burden. The trial court's failure 
properly to place the burden of proof is reversible error. 
Compounding this error, the trial court eviscerated the 
Agreement by reducing the standard for termination from "refusal" 
to perform the duties set forth in the Agreement to simple 
"failure" to perform such duties. The plain language of the 
Agreement requires Heritage to justify Kraatz's discharge with 
proof of dishonesty or refusal to do his duty, as opposed to mere 
failure. This standard requires proof of a culpable mental state, 
a willful and substantial breach of the employment obligations. 
The trial court ignored the plain language of the Agreement and 
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essentially rewrote the Agreement to relieve Heritage of its 
obligations thereunder, rather than to enforce the terms of the 
Agreement as they stood. 
Finally, the court ignored Utah law regarding incorporation 
of an Employee Handbook into an employment contract and in 
essence concluded that a handbook can never add to the terms of 
an integrated employment agreement. 
In addition to the foregoing errors of law, the trial court 
made numerous clearly erroneous findings of fact. At the outset, 
the trial court failed to base its findings upon the appropriate 
standard of performance under the Agreement, which is Kraatz's 
"best professional skill." No other potentially applicable 
standards were ever established. The trial court further ignored 
Heritage's admissions that (1) Kraatz tried to operate the 
Dealership profitably; (2) Kraatz tried to train B. Wilkinson's 
children; and (3) Kraatz is an honest man who would never 
intentionally try to deceive. 
I 
The simple truth is that there is no evidence of willful and 
substantial wrongdoing by Kraatz. The testimony at trial consists 
of broad generalizations, conclusory statements, and 
unsubstantiated allegations. This testimony is not sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact, and it is 
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not sufficient to satisfy Heritage's legal burden to demonstrate 
that it terminated Kraatz for cause. 
This Court should vacate the trial court's erroneous 
findings and substitute its own findings based upon the clear 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT DEFENDANTS HAD 
NO BURDEN TO PROVE KRAATZ'S DISCHARGE WAS JUSTIFIED. 
Kraatz's prima facie case for wrongful termination was 
established by the undisputed facts that (1) the Agreement was a 
contract of employment for a definite term, (2) Kraatz was 
employed as General Manager of the Dealership under the Agreement 
for 27 months, during which time he admittedly tried to run the 
Dealership profitably (R.2001) and tried to train B. Wilkinson's 
children (R.1877), and (3) Kraatz suffered damage because of his 
early termination, including loss of income and forfeiture of 
stock appreciation rights. (R.2232.) 
After proving the existence of the Agreement for a definite 
term, Kraatz was entitled to a presumption that he satisfactorily 
served his employer. Chiodo v. General Warehouse Corp., 17 Utah 
2d 425, 413 P.2d 891, 893, fn.3 (1966) (citing Russell v. Ogden 
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Union Railroad, 122 Utah 107, 247 P.2d 257 (1952)); see also 
E. Kimball and R. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 3-17 (1996) ("People 
are presumed to be sane, careful, honest, able-bodied, and so 
on.")/ 29 AM. JUR 2D Evidence § 270 (1994) (there is a 
"presumption that someone acted in accord with his contractual 
obligations"). The effect of such a presumption shifts the burden 
of proof, both of production and persuasion, to the employer. See 
Advisory Committee Note to UTAH R. EVID. 3 01. 
i i 
The law in Utah is well-settled that under a contract of 
employment for a definite term the "employer has the burden of 
showing justification for discharge." Chiodo, 413 P. 2d at 893; 
Russell, 247 P. 2d at 260-61. Absent a contractual standard, the 
employer must prove a "willful and substantial failure" on the 
part of the employee to render honest, faithful and loyal 
service. Chiodo, 413 P. 2d at 892. An employer's right to 
terminate an employee may be even further restricted by contract. 
Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997); 
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55-56 (Utah 1991). 
In this case there is an express written agreement that 
Kraatz's employment may be "terminated only for cause [and] upon 
satisfaction of [an] agreed upon condition," namely, for Kraatz's 
"refusal" to perform his responsibilities as General Manager or 
for "dishonesty." (App. B-Exh. 38.) Cf. Fox, 931 P.2d at 859. 
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Thus, the trial court's conclusion of law that "there is no 
burden upon Defendants to prove that the discharge of Plaintiff 
was justified" is incorrect. (R.1703.) Furthermore, since 
allocation of the burden of proof may be outcome determinative, 
the trial court could not make proper findings of fact without a 
proper view of the burden of proof. See UTAH R. EVID. 301 and 
Advisory Committee Note thereto. The court's decision must be 
reversed for failure properly to place upon Heritage the burden 
of proof, both of production and of persuasion, to justify 
Kraatz's discharge. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT "CAUSE" 
FOR TERMINATION UNDER THE AGREEMENT INCLUDED "FAILURE" 
The trial court's conclusion of law that u [clause, under the 
Agreement, includes Plaintiff's failure to perform the duties set 
forth in the Agreement" is patently incorrect. (Conclusion B.9.) 
The court's interpretation tortures the plain meaning of the 
terms used in Section 2.1 of the Agreement to reach an absurd 
result not contemplated by the parties. Such a result must be 
eschewed by this Court for the reasons set forth below. 
Section 2.1 of the Agreement provides, in its entirety: 
2.1 TERM. The term of Employee's employment pursuant 
to this Agreement shall commence on or before June 15, 
1990, and shall continue thereafter on the terms and 
conditions provided herein for a term of five years and 
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thereafter shall continue on a year to year basis, 
until terminated upon sixty (60) days advance written 
notice by either party. Employee's employment may not 
be terminated except for cause as defined herein. For 
purposes of this paragraph, cause shall be deemed to 
include the following: 
A; Fraud; 
B; Dishonesty; 
Ci Refusal by Employee to fulfill his employment 
responsibilities described in Article I of this 
Agreement; or 
D: Employee becomes disabled to the extent he is 
unable to perform his duties hereunder as specified in 
Article I of this Agreement and such disability 
continues for a period of time longer than six (6) 
consecutive months. (Emphasis added). 
The court construed Section 2.1 of the Agreement as a matter 
of law, without reference to extrinsic evidence. (Conclusions 
8.a. & 8.b.) The trial court's interpretation of the Agreement is 
therefore accorded no presumption of correctness, and this Court 
reviews the construction under a correction-of-error standard. 
Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P. 2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 
App. 1993). This Court is thus free to make its "own independent 
interpretation of the contract terms." Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 
733, 735 (Utah 1980). 
A. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED PROPERLY TO EMPLOY STANDARD 
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION. 
A "cardinal rule" in construing contracts is "to give effect 
to the intentions of the parties, and if possible, these 
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intentions should be gleaned from an examination of the text of 
the contract itself." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 
P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). "Each contract provision is to be 
considered in relation to all of the others, with a view toward 
giving effect to all and ignoring none." Plateau Min. Co. v. Utah 
Div. Of State Lands & Forestry, 820 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). 
In interpreting contracts, uthe ordinary and usual meaning 
of the words used is given effect." Warburton v. Virginia Beach 
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P. 2d 779, 783 (Utah App. 1995) . 
"All words used by the parties must, if possible, be given their 
usual and ordinary meaning and effect." Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. 
Blair, 565 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added). 
1. The Trial Court Erroneously Concluded That the Parties' 
Use of the Term "Include" in Section 2.1 Expanded the 
Definition of "Cause" Beyond the Circumstances 
Expressly Set Forth by the Parties. 
The trial court's conclusion that the parties did not intend 
to limit the definition of "cause" to the four circumstances set 
forth in Section 2.1 (Conclusion 8.b.[l]) is based in part upon 
its faulty construction of the term "include" as a term of 
enlargement. 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that the word uxincluding' 
is susceptible of different shades of meaning." State v. Montello 
Salt Co., 98 P. 549, 551 (Utah 1908). The Court explained that 
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[i]t may be used in the sense to comprise or embrace, 
as this volume includes all his works; to confine or to 
contain, as the shell of a nut includes the kernel; to 
express the idea that a thing in question constitutes a 
part only of the contents of some other thing; as a 
word of enlargement, and in ordinary signification 
implying that something else has been given beyond the 
general language which precedes it . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted). 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Utah 
court's construction of the term "including" as a word of 
enlargement, stating: "The [Utah Supreme] court also considered 
that the word 'including' was used as a word of enlargement, the 
learned court being of opinion that such was its ordinary sense. 
I 
With this we cannot concur. It is its exceptional sense, as the 
i 
dictionaries and cases indicate." Montello Salt Co. v. State of 
Utah, 221 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1911)(emphasis added). 
In the context of the Agreement at issue, the construction 
the parties themselves placed upon the term "include" by their 
usage of the term in the Agreement is illuminating. Section 
1.2(b) of the Agreement clearly demonstrates that when these 
parties intended that "include" should be a term of illustration 
or enlargement rather than a term of limitation, they used the 
phrase "shall include, but not be limited to." If the parties had 
intended their use of the word "include" in Section 2.1 to be 
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non-exclusive or merely illustrative, they could have employed 
similar language—but they chose not to. 
The parties plainly intended that "cause" for termination 
was limited to the four circumstances specifically set forth by 
the parties. Such a construction is entirely consistent with 
Kraatz's testimony that the four circumstances set forth in the 
Agreement were the only circumstances under which the parties 
agreed his employment could be terminated. (R.1762-63, 1772.) 
The trial court's interpretation of the word "include" to 
expand the definition of "cause" ignores precedent, as well as 
the clear written intent of the parties and Kraatz's 
uncontroverted testimony. 
2. The Trial Court Erroneously Concluded That the Term 
uHerein// as Employed in the Definitional Paragraph of 
Section 2.1 Expanded the Definition of "Cause." 
The term "herein" is a locative adverb which may refer to "a 
single paragraph, to a section, or to the entire contract in 
which it is used." Saulsberry v. Maddix, 125 F.2d 430, 434 (6th 
Cir. 1942) (emphasis added). Again, its meaning is to be 
determined from the context in which it appears. Id. 
The trial court's conclusion that the phrase was defined 
herein" used in Section 2.1 refers to the entire Agreement 
(Conclusion B.8.b[2]) again impermissibly attempts to expand the 
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definition of the term "cause," blithely disregarding the context 
in which the phrase appears. In context, the phrase reads: 
Employee's employment may not be terminated except for 
cause as defined herein. For purposes of this 
paragraph, cause shall be deemed to include the 
following . . . (Emphasis added.) 
When the phrase is read in conjunction with the entire 
sentence in which it appears, together with the next following 
sentence, it is apparent that "as defined herein" refers to the 
specific definition set forth in Section 2.1, rather than some 
hypothetical definition to be gleaned somehow from the Agreement 
as a whole. The trial court's construction should be rejected. 
3, The Trial Court Erroneously Concluded That the Parties 
Intended the Term "Refusal" as Used in Section 2.1 to 
be Synonymous With the Term "Failure." 
The trial court's conclusion (Conclusion B.8.b.[3]) that 
these parties intended that any subjective "failure" by Kraatz 
under the Agreement could be cause for termination of his 
employment ignores the plain meaning of the term "refusal." 
In common usage, "refusal" implies that a demand has been 
made and rejected.1 Utah cases recognize and employ the common 
1
 See e . g . , RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 
Unabridged, 1622 (2d ed. 1987) (refuse: 1. To decline to accept 
. . . . 2. To decline to give; deny (a request, demand, etc.) 
. . . . 3. To express a determination not to (do something) 
. . . . 4. To decline to submit to . . . . 9. To decline 
acceptance, consent or compliance.) 
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usage. See, e.g., Brooks v. Scoville, 17 P.2d 218, 220 (Utah 
1932) (allegation of failure to perform not synonymous with 
allegation of refusal to perform nor of repudiation or denial of 
obligation to perform); Green v. Palfreyman, 166 P.2d 215, 220 
(Utah 1946) (plaintiff did not willfully fail or refuse to 
complete work where no evidence of refusal to proceed with work 
nor evidence of demand, request or instruction to resume the 
work); Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 165 (Utah 
1965) (action for wrongful discharge where employee refused to 
comply with employer's extortionate demands); Peterson v. 
Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1281-82 (Utah 1992) (discharge for 
refusal to violate law at employer's request actionable under 
public policy limitation). 
Even in the absence of an overt rejection of a specific 
demand or request, "refusal" implies a "positive intention to 
disobey," or at least "a mental determination not to comply." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (Gth ed. 1990). See Cobabe v. Stanger, 
844 P.2d 298, 302-03 (Utah 1992) (party's refusal to make payment 
under personal services contract manifested "a positive and 
unequivocal intent not to render its promised performance," 
resulting in anticipatory breach of contract) (emphasis added). 
%[R]efusal' implies something more than a mere passive 
failure. . . . x[R]efusal' is closely analogous to, if 
not synonymous with, a 'willful failure, ' for a refusal 
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usually implies a previous demand or request, or the 
existence of circumstances equivalent thereto. It means 
more than mere inert default by neglect. 
County Canvassing Board of Primary Elections of Hillsborough 
County v. Lester, 118 So. 201, 203 (Fla. 1928) . "A 'willful 
failure' denotes a conscious purpose to disobey, a culpable 
omission, and not merely innocent neglect." Id. at 202 (emphasis 
added). 
Clearly, "'[f]ail' is distinguished from 'refuse' in that 
i i 
'refuse' involves an act of the will, while 'fail' may be an act 
of inevitable necessity." House v. Campbell, 628 So.2d 448, 450 
(Ala. 1993) (emphasis added) . See also Taylor v. Mason, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 325, 344 (1824); Maestas v. American Metal Co., 20 
P.2d 924, 925 (N.M. 1933) . 
Interpreting "refusal" in the context of the Agreement to 
mean a manifestation by Kraatz of a positive and unequivocal 
intent not to render his promised performance is the only 
reasonable construction of the term. In contrast, to equate 
"refusal" with "failure" gives no effect to the provision of 
paragraph 1.2. of the Agreement which requires only that Kraatz 
use his "Jbest professional skill" to "provide day-to-day 
management over the operations of the Dealership" and to "provide 
management training to persons selected by the Company." Kraatz 
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cannot be held to perform as though he had Larry Miller's 
financial strength and management team at his disposal. 
The trial court's conclusions imply that Kraatz in effect 
guaranteed that he would make a profit, that he would never make 
a poor business decision, that he would never have unhappy 
employees, that he would work more than 60 hours per week, 
including every Saturday, and that he would successfully train B. 
Wilkinson's admittedly resentful children to be Honda dealers 
within 27 months. (Cf. Conclusions D.l. through D.7.) Such a 
construction flies in the face of the manifest intent of the 
parties. 
These parties deliberately used the word "refusal" after 
careful consideration. They could have easily chosen the term 
"failure," if that was in fact what they intended. They did not. 
This Court should enforce the intent of the parties by according 
the term "refuse" its common, ordinary usage and restricting 
"cause" for termination under the Agreement to a willful or 
intentional dereliction of duty, rather than expanding "cause" to 
include subjective failure to achieve unrealistic expectations. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED THE AGREEMENT TO 
RELIEVE HERITAGE OF WHAT THE COURT PERCEIVED TO BE AN 
UNFAVORABLE BARGAIN. 
The trial court equated "refusal" with "failure," concluding 
that u[t]o interpret refusal as requiring Plaintiff to remain 
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employed even in the face of the Dealership's losing money, 
losing its financing, and having to be sold or liquidated is an 
absurd result . . . ." (Conclusion B.8.b.(3) (c) . ) Further, the 
trial court opined that " [i]t would be inequitable in this case 
to interpret the Agreement such that Heritage would have to 
continue to employ Plaintiff and stand by and watch its business 
decline unless Plaintiff specifically rejected an outright 
request." (Cone. B.8.b. (3) (d) . ) 
These conclusions reflect blatant judicial revision of the 
Agreement. It is axiomatic that a court "may not make a better 
contract for the parties than they have made for themselves; 
furthermore, a court may not enforce asserted rights not 
supported by the contract itself." Ted R. Brown & Assoc, Inc. v. 
Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970 (Utah App. 1988). 
By the plain language of Section 1.2, Heritage turned over 
operation of the Dealership to Kraatz, giving him "responsibility 
and authority over all aspects of the daily operations" and the 
"authority, as General Manager, to make and carry out management 
decisions relating to the operation of the Dealership." 
(HH 1.2 [a] Sc [b] .) Heritage then agreed that Kraatz could be 
fired only under circumstances of fraud, dishonesty, refusal to 
perform, or disability. (Section 2.1). B. Wilkinson subsequently 
regretted the bargain. He was faced with sharing with Kraatz a 
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portion of the proceeds from the contemplated sale of Heritage to 
Larry Miller; he was under pressure from J. Wilkinson to make J. 
Wilkinson the general manager; and Heritage was not doing as well 
as he hoped. He was looking for a way out, which the trial court 
magnanimously supplied. 
Notwithstanding B. Wilkinson's perceived hardship, "it 
cannot be adopted as a general precept of contract law that, 
whenever one party to a contract can show injury flowing from the 
exercise of a contract right by the other, a basis for relief 
will be somehow devised by the courts." Ted R. Brown & Assoc, 
753 P. 2d at 970. It uis not the prerogative of this court to 
prevent the enforcement of contracts that a party subsequently 
regrets." Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P. 2d 
457, 462, n. 6. (Utah App. 1996). Neither the parties, nor the 
court "has any right to ignore or modify conditions which are 
clearly expressed merely because it may subject one of the 
parties to hardship," but the conditions must be enforced "in 
accordance with the intention as manifested by the language used 
by the parties to the contract." Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 321 
P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958). 
"Refusal" means "refusal," not "failure." This Court should 
so rule. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE PROGRESSIVE 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES OF THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK DID NOT 
APPLY TO KRAATZ'S TERMINATION, 
The trial court's conclusions that Kraatz failed to 
demonstrate that he was entitled to progressive discipline 
pursuant to the Employee Handbook (App. B—Exh. 13 5, policy 314) 
and that any rights associated with the handbook were terminated 
by Kraatz's action in having the Handbooks turned in (Conclusion 
C.3.) are also erroneous. 
The trial court's conclusion that the parties intended the 
Agreement to be integrated (Conclusion C.l.) is correct to the 
extent that the Agreement represents the final agreement 
concerning the subject matter contained therein. However, the 
court failed to recognize that the subject of termination 
procedures is not dealt with in the Agreement. While the 
Agreement specifies the circumstances under which Kraatz's 
employment could be terminated, it is silent on the method by 
which Kraatz was to be disciplined. Therefore, to the extent that 
the trial court concluded that the termination procedures set 
forth in the Handbook are inconsistent with, and contradictory 
of, the Agreement, its conclusion is also incorrect. (Conclusion 
C.2.) 
Furthermore, the progressive discipline procedures in the 
Handbook are completely consistent with the interpretation of 
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"refusal" as denial of a demand in the context of the Agreement. 
The discipline procedures in the Handbook establish a process by 
which Heritage could give Kraatz notice of any perceived 
deficiencies in his performance and afford him the opportunity 
either to cure the deficiencies or to refuse compliance. 
Utah law is clear that an employer's internally adopted 
policies and procedures concerning discharge can become part of 
the contractual relationship between an employer and his 
employee. See, e.g. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltr. , 111 P. 2d 
1033, 1044-46 (Utah 1989) . See also Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & 
Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483, 485 n.3 (Utah 1989) " [A] n 
employer may be bound to follow any discharge procedures outlined 
in an employee handbook." Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 833 P.2d 
331, 335 (Utah 1992). Such was the case here. 
Kraatz received a copy of the handbook when he began 
employment. (R.1769.) The fact that Kraatz did not know of the 
Handbook at the time he signed the Agreement is irrelevant. As 
the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged: 
u
 [A] n employer's statements of policy, practice and 
procedures can give rise to contractual rights in 
employees without evidence that the parties mutually 
agreed that the policy statements would create 
contractual rights in the employee, and, . . . hence, 
although the statement of policy is signed by neither 
party, can be unilaterally amended by the employer 
without notice to the employee, and contains no 
reference to a specific employee, his [or her] job 
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description or compensation, and although no reference 
was made to the policy statement in preemployment 
interviews and the employee does not learn of its 
existence until after his [or her] hiring." 
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483, 485 n.3 
(Utah 1989)(citation omitted.) 
There is no evidence that the Handbook policies or 
disciplinary procedures were ever repudiated by Heritage. App. B— 
Exh. 23, relied upon by the trial court, is a notice to employees 
to turn in their Handbooks to Heritage, not a repudiation of any 
specific corporate policies. Whether Kraatz himself employed the 
procedures in disciplining is irrelevant {cf. Finding F13, 
R.1999), although the record shows that he did in fact use verbal 
warnings with J. Wilkinson, a form of progressive discipline 
under the Handbook. (R.1813, 1820-22.) 
Kraatz was entitled to the benefit of the progressive 
discipline procedure set forth in the Handbook. Heritage breached 
the Agreement by terminating Kraatz's employment and failing to 
follow such procedures. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING ALLEGED 
MISCONDUCT BY KRAATZ ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
It is Kraatz's burden to marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the trial court's Findings and then demonstrate why, 
even when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, 
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it is insufficient to support the Finding. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 
P.2d 927 (Utah App. 1990). A finding is clearly erroneous if it 
is against the great weight of the evidence or if the appellate 
court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake 
has been made, because, for example, the finding was induced by 
an erroneous view of the law. Western Capital & Securities, Inc. 
v. Knudsvig, 768 P. 2d 989 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In this case, Kraatz attacks the trial court's oral and 
written Findings which conclude or imply that Kraatz was in any 
way "dishonest" or that he "refused" to perform his 
responsibilities as General Manager of the Dealership to the best 
of his professional ability. Kraatz requests that the erroneous 
findings be stricken and that the Court substitute its own 
finding that Heritage did not meet its burden to justify Kraatz' 
discharge and is therefor liable to Kraatz. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE BASED MERELY ON 
UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING WITHOUT REFERENCE 
TO ANY SPECIFIC ACT OF MISCONDUCT. 
B. Wilkinson's testimony on direct examination by his own 
counsel as to why he fired Kraatz is only nine pages long. 
(R.2033-41.) In his testimony B. Wilkinson makes many vague 
allegations of misconduct, but fails to substantiate any 
allegation by reference to date, circumstance, parties involved, 
documentation or quantification. His conclusory testimony was 
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devoid of any basic facts to support the allegations. Such 
unsubstantiated statements are of so little probative value that 
they are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact. See 
Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985); Tolman v. 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P. 2d 23, fn. 7 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (conclusory oral testimony insufficient to meet burden); 
Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service Commission, 720 P. 2d 1373, 
1379 (Utah 1986) (burden not met by conclusory oral testimony). 
B. Wilkinson's direct examination was followed by fifty-six 
pages of cross examination. (R.1947-2002.) B. Wilkinson's 
testimony during cross examination revealed that: (1) the things 
he complained of were mistakes made by other employees, including 
members of B. Wilkinson's family (R.1949-50); (2) the standard 
for "overage used cars" was not well defined (R.1950, 1952-55); 
(3) no written reprimand was ever issued to Kraatz (R.1951); (4) 
B. Wilkinson's allegations were wholly unsupported by documentary 
evidence, were based on immaterial circumstances, and were 
arbitrary in nature (R.1952-55); (5) matters were improving at 
the time Kraatz was fired (R.1955); (6) Wilkinson had agreed with 
the business decision Kraatz made to switch the flooring line 
from Comerica to Key Bank at the time it was made, two years 
prior to Kraatz's dismissal (R.1956-73); (7) the "title problems" 
B. Wilkinson referred to were caused by the neglect of a "title 
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clerk" (R.1976) and a salesman (R.1979); (8) B. Wilkinson 
believed that Kraatz was an honest man (R.1977); (9) B. Wilkinson 
didn't believe that Kraatz would intentionally try to deceive him 
(R.1977); (10) B. Wilkinson could not point to a material decline 
in gross profit margin (R.1986); (11) no reason cited by B. 
Wilkinson was in and of itself sufficient, in B. Wilkinson's own 
opinion', to fire Kraatz (R.1988-89); (12) B. Wilkinson himself 
controlled important and expensive aspects of the Dealership and 
took some responsibility himself for the losses sustained 
(R.1998-2000); and (13) B. Wilkinson believed Kraatz tried to run 
the Dealership in a profitable fashion (R.2001). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS REGARDING KRAATZ'S PURPORTED ACTS 
OF DISHONESTY ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
1. There Is Insufficient Evidence to Support the Trial 
Court's Oral Finding That Kraatz Manipulated the 
Balance Sheet or the Finding is Contrary to the Great 
Weight of Evidence. 
The trial court's oral finding that " [Kraatz] manipulated 
and/or modified the balance sheet by disguising the age of 
inventory units which should have been returned and/or sold but 
were not" (R.2469) is supported, if at all, only by B. 
Wilkinson's rambling testimony on direct examination that (1) 
Kraatz had not been "exactly honest . . . about the status of 
used car overaged inventory, and titles on hand, trade-ins and 
titles that had been remitted without payment" (R.2034-35); and 
-32-
(2) that he fired Kraatz for "not always leveling with me on 
certain accounts, titles in, overaged used cars and such." 
(R.1877.) The only other "evidence" upon which the court might 
have erroneously relied to make its conclusion is that, by B. 
Wilkinson's own admission, the corporate operating statements for 
1992 did not reflect a material overaged used car problem. 
(R. 1952-55, App B, Exh. 297, bates no. 169.) The foregoing 
evidence is all that possibly supports the Finding. The evidence 
is insufficient, or contrary to the great weight of evidence, for 
the following reasons. 
Neither B. Wilkinson nor anyone else ever accused Kraatz of 
"manipulating and/or modifying the balance sheet by disguising 
the age of inventory units" as found by the trial court. B. 
Wilkinson did say that Kraatz wasn't "exactly honest" and that he 
hadn't "leveled" with B. Wilkinson about overaged used cars, but 
B. Wilkinson never substantiated his allegation with any basic 
facts which would allow the court to understand what he meant or 
which would allow Kraatz to respond. It is quite a leap for the 
trial court to infer that what B. Wilkinson meant by his vague 
testimony was that Kraatz "manipulated and/or modified" the 
corporate records and was "disguising the age of inventory units" 
(R.2469), when B. Wilkinson himself clarified during cross 
examination that he didn't mean any such thing: 
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(M. Zundel) Q: Was it the fact that there were overaged 
cars or that Tony hadn't been honest with you about 
there being overaged cars; what is it? 
(B. Wilkinson) A: The fact that there were overaged 
used cars and there were some title problems. I said 
that before. (R.1951.) 
Later in B. Wilkinson's testimony he admitted he thought 
Kraatz to be an honest man and did not think Kraatz would 
intentionally try to deceive him. (R.1977.) B. Wilkinson admitted 
that the only documents he had to support his contention that 
there was an overaged car problem at all were the financial 
statements. (App. B—Exh. 297, line 250 of each Fin. Stat, in the 
Exhibit; R.1952) But upon examination of the exhibits, he 
admitted that the so-called overaged used car problem was not 
material when Kraatz was fired in 1992. (R.1952-55.) Further, B. 
Wilkinson was not able to identify any particular month in any 
year when he considered overaged used cars to be a material 
problem. (R.1947-52.) 
B. Wilkinson never repudiated the accuracy of the financial 
documents to which he himself referred to support his position, 
even when examination showed they did not support him. When asked 
to admit, based upon the financial documents, that the used cars 
situation was improving when Kraatz was fired, he simply said, 
"It was about time." (R.1955.) Defendants' counsel did not 
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suggest in any of his arguments or proposed written findings that 
falsification of the records regarding used cars ever took place. 
Heritage's written Finding E21(e) is as close as Heritage's 
counsel came. The Finding states, "B. Wilkinson testified he 
fired Plaintiff for . . . failure to accurately inform B. 
Wilkinson of the dealings and status of the dealership." 
(R.1694.) "Inaccuracy" and "dishonesty" are materially different 
things. Inaccuracy is a part of every life. Dishonesty 
necessarily involves moral turpitude. Webster's Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1985)/ Research-Planning, Inc. v. Bank of 
Utah, 690 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1984). 
The court impermissibly inferred that the financial 
statements had been manipulated by Kraatz just because they did 
not support B. Wilkinson's allegations that there was an overaged 
inventory problem. The trial court's Finding is clearly erroneous 
and wholly unfounded and should be stricken. 
2. There is Insufficient Evidence to Support The Trial 
Court's Oral Finding Regarding Improper Distribution of 
Vehicle Titles, or the Finding is Contrary to the Great 
Weight of Evidence or is Insufficient to Justify 
Kraatz's Discharge, 
The trial court's oral Finding that "Plaintiff allowed on at 
least one occasion against company policy for a title to be 
distributed without payment" is also clearly erroneous. (R.2469.) 
The only support for this Finding is, again, the rambling, 
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unsubstantiated testimony of B. Wilkinson on direct examination 
that he fired Kraatz for "titles not collected, cars delivered to 
wholesalers without the collection of titles or without the 
collection of monies and already having given wholesalers the 
titles." (R.1877, 2034.) 
On cross examination, B. Wilkinson admitted that his 
allegations regarding uncollected titles were based on (1) a 
mistake of "the used car title clerk" (R.1976), (2) the mistake 
of a salesman, Tim Rideout, (R.1979), and (3) B. Wilkinson's view 
that "it doesn't matter whose job it was" because it was Kraatz's 
job to "get a handle" (R.1978) and that B. Wilkinson was "mad" at 
Kraatz because he allegedly "didn't know what the hell was going 
on" (R.1976.) 
When asked when the title clerk delivered the title before 
receiving payment, B. Wilkinson testified that he couldn't 
remember (R.1974, 1997), but admitted the money owed Heritage on 
the transaction was received "about two days later." (R.1976.) B. 
Wilkinson also couldn't remember when Tim Rideout accepted a 
trade-in without immediately obtaining its title (R.1978), but 
admitted that Kraatz "got Rideout to go to Nevada and get it 
resolved." (R.1979.) B. Wilkinson complained that when the trade-
in was finally sold it didn't bring "the amount I was told that 
the deal would reflect" (R.1979-80) as justification for his 
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accusation that Kraatz had not been "exactly honest" (R.2034) or 
was guilty of "not always leveling." (R.1877.) 
B. Wilkinson never described any situation where Kraatz 
knowingly gave him false information or willfully breached any 
policy regarding the collection of vehicle titles. Furthermore, 
B. Wilkinson failed to describe Heritage's policy regarding 
credit to wholesalers or courtesies to customers who sometimes 
left the titles to their trade-ins at home. The evidence that 
Heritage did produce failed to show that Kraatz willfully 
"allowed . . . a title to be distributed without payment" . . . 
"against company policy." (R.2469.) 
Finally, B. Wilkinson did not explain why the "title 
problems," (R.1951) which were admittedly resolved, were material 
or substantial, as opposed to merely sporadic problems of 
ordinary variety and of little consequence to the Dealership. 
The finding should be stricken as clearly erroneous or ruled 
insufficient to justify Kraatz's discharge. 
C. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS THAT KRAATZ WRONGFULLY "REFUSED" TO WORK SATURDAYS 
AND EVENINGS OR THE FINDINGS ARE CONTRARY TO THE GREAT 
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE OR ARE INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY KRAATZ'S 
DISCHARGE. 
The oral Finding of the trial court that Kraatz "refused to 
work Saturdays and evenings when his visibility was required as 
it interfered with his personal activities" (R.2469), and written 
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Findings E15 and E21(d) to the same effect, are supported, if at 
all, by eight pages of testimony from B. Wilkinson (R.2006, 2035-
37, 1937-40), nine pages of testimony from J. Wilkinson (R.2058-
62), and the work schedule prepared by J. Wilkinson (App. B—Exh. 
1) , ostensibly pursuant to authority given him by his father, 
which would have required Kraatz to work every Saturday between 
September 6 and October 17, 1992. Kraatz admitted that he was 
unable to work the schedule J. Wilkinson presented to him. 
(R.1809-11.) 
The court's oral and written findings are contrary to the 
great weight of the evidence as demonstrated below. Kraatz 
challenges any finding that his discharge was based on "refusal" 
(as opposed to "inability") to accept a work schedule prepared by 
his subordinate, J. Wilkinson, or that he was "required" to work 
Saturdays and evenings as scheduled by J. Wilkinson. 
1. Finding E21(d) Is Clearly Erroneous. 
Finding E21(d) that "B. Wilkinson testified he fired 
plaintiff for the following reasons: . . . (d) refusal to work 
Saturdays when scheduled by B. Wilkinson" is clearly erroneous 
because B. Wilkinson did not so testify. When asked by Heritage's 
counsel why he fired Kraatz, B. Wilkinson said, u[Kraatz's] 
inability to be visible in the evening and on Saturdays." (R.2035 
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lines 7-8.) Finding E21(d) mischaracterizes this testimony and 
finds no support elsewhere in the record. 
2. Finding E15 Is Clearly Erroneous 
Finding E15 is the trial court's written Finding of what 
Kraatz did, as opposed to its mischaracterization of what B. 
Wilkinson said Kraatz did. The court found: 
Plaintiff refused to work the schedule B. Wilkinson had 
ordered J. Wilkinson to prepare, despite the fact that 
the busiest day of the week in car sales is Saturday, 
and the busiest sales time of the day is after 4:00 
p.m. 
Finding E15 is clearly erroneous because both B. Wilkinson 
and J. Wilkinson admitted that B. Wilkinson did not order J. 
Wilkinson to schedule Kraatz to work every Saturday. (R.1938, 
2362-63.) 
3. Heritage Failed To Show Kraatz Had A Culpable Or 
Intransigent Attitude In Declining To Work The Schedule 
Proposed By J. Wilkinson. 
Kraatz testified that when J. Wilkinson presented the 
proposed work schedule to him, Kraatz explained to J. Wilkinson 
that it would be difficult for him to take a week day off and 
work every Saturday because he had to deal with the banks during 
the week when they were open. (R.1808-11.) Kraatz testified that 
he sometimes worked Saturdays anyway. (R.1770.) Kraatz also 
testified that he was available by cell phone on his off hours. 
(R.1771.) Kraatz's testimony was not rebutted except that J. 
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Wilkinson testified that Kraatz referred to religious 
responsibilities (as opposed to dealing with banks) which 
prevented him from working some of the Saturdays on J. 
Wilkinson's proposed schedule. (R.2367-70.) Kraatz did not insist 
that he work no Saturdays at all, but only rejected J. 
Wilkinson's demand that he work every Saturday between September 
6 and October 17, 1992. (R.2367-70.) 
B. Wilkinson's testimony that Kraatz was unable to be 
visible in the evenings and on Saturdays and that he felt like 
over a period of time Kraatz "slacked off" does not support a 
finding of refusal by Kraatz to do his duty. Kraatz's unrebutted 
testimony was that he worked 50-60 hours per week at the 
Dealership and that his days typically started at 7:30 in the 
morning. (R.1770-71.) There is nothing in the Agreement which 
would require Kraatz to work more than five days per week, eight 
hours per day and there was no evidence that industry standards 
require general managers to work ten hours per day, six days per 
week, or more. There was no testimony that Kraatz's contractual 
promise to devote his "full and exclusive time" to the Dealership 
meant something more than a 40 hour work week. 
If over an unspecified "period of time" Kraatz "slacked off" 
his aggressive work schedule, perhaps he was tired, or sick, or 
on vacation as his contract allows. Without a specific allegation 
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of misfeasance, including date and circumstance, Kraatz is unable 
to respond to the vague accusation that he vvslacked off." 
4. Heritage Failed To Produce Any Evidence At Trial That 
Kraatz's "Visibility" On Saturdays And Evenings Was 
"Required" By Industry Standards Or By The Terms Of His 
Agreement. 
The testimony supporting the trial court's finding that 
Kraatz's "visibility" was "required" is cited by the court in its 
written Finding E15 (R.1693) and is derived from B. Wilkinson's 
testimony that "Saturdays are the biggest sales days and from 
4:00 p.m. in the afternoon till closing is the best sales time of 
each day." (R.2006.) 
B. Wilkinson testified that he fired Kraatz because of 
Kraatz's "inability to be visible in the store in the evenings 
and on Saturdays" and that "visibility was—important." (R.2035.) 
B. Wilkinson also testified that he "felt that the General 
Manager needed to be more visible in the store in the later 
hours" (R.1938) and that "the evening hours are the most 
productive hours. Visibility of, quote, unquote, the man whose 
responsible for the operation day-to-day, I felt that over a 
period of time Tony slacked off on his later in the evening and 
Saturday performances." (R.2036-37.) 
B. Wilkinson testified that "I had asked Mr. Kraatz several 
times to work on Saturdays." (R.1938.) J. Wilkinson testified 
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that his father asked him to prepare a work schedule and that "he 
[B. Wilkinson] told me he wanted the General Manager to work 
nights and Saturdays." (R.2368.) Finally, there is Kraatz's own 
testimony that he worked fifty to sixty hours per week and 
sometimes part of a Saturday. (R.1700.) 
The foregoing testimony is all of the evidence supporting 
the court's finding that Kraatz's "visibility" was "required" on 
the Saturdays and evenings scheduled by J. Wilkinson. The 
evidence is demonstrably insufficient for the following reasons. 
B. Wilkinson admitted that " [f]irst of all, I don't remember 
asking him [J. Wilkinson] to schedule [Kraatz for] all Saturdays, 
but I asked him to do it [make a work schedule] because I felt 
that the General Manager needed to be more visible in the store 
in the later hours." (R.1938.) (Emphasis added.) J. Wilkinson 
quoted his father as saying "not necessarily every Saturday, but 
Saturdays" when authorizing J. Wilkinson to prepare a work 
schedule for Kraatz. (R.2363.) 
Kraatz was responsible for every department in the 
Dealership, including "new and used car sales departments, 
service department, parts department and finance and insurance 
department." (App. B—Exh. 3 8.) Some of those departments are not 
open in the evenings or all day on Saturdays. Kraatz was 
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uncontrovertedly responsible for dealing with Heritage's banks, 
which were not open at all on Saturdays. (R.1937-39.) 
The evidence that Saturdays and evenings are the most 
productive (R.2006), and B. Wilkinson's "feelings" that the 
"General Manager needed to be more visible . . . in the later 
hours" (R.1938) and that Kraatz "over a period of time slacked 
off on his later in the evening and Saturday performances" 
(R.2037) does not amount to a contractual or industry standard 
against which Kraatz's actual performance can be measured. 
B. Wilkinson testified that he asked Kraatz to "work 
Saturdays," but admitted that he did not expect Kraatz to work 
"all Saturdays." (R.1938.) The question of how many Saturdays in 
September and October, 1992, Kraatz should have agreed to work to 
satisfy B. Wilkinson was left unanswered by the Defendants, 
except for J. Wilkinson's demand that Kraatz work every Saturday. 
5. It Was Inappropriate For J. Wilkinson To Prepare 
Kraatz's Work Schedule. 
Kraatz's Agreement clearly states that he was given 
"authority over all aspects of the day-to-day operations." (App. 
B—Exh. 38) J. Wilkinson testified that he had never prepared a 
work schedule for Kraatz as a General Manager before the 
September/October schedule. (R.2364.) Further, Kraatz testified 
that he did not request J. Wilkinson to prepare the schedule for 
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him. (R.1809-11.) Therefore, B. Wilkinson's authorization of his 
son, J. Wilkinson, to control Kraatz's work schedule was a 
wrongful contravention of Kraatz's contractual authority, and it 
was appropriate for Kraatz to question the schedule. 
D. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS REGARDING KRAATZ'S PURPORTED REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO 
TRAIN B. WILKINSON'S CHILDREN OR THE FINDINGS ARE CONTRARY 
TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. 
There is no written or oral finding that Kraatz "refused" to 
train B. Wilkinson's children to be managers or dealers 
acceptable to American Honda, nor was there evidence from which 
such a finding could be made. The court's oral Finding was that 
Kraatz "failed to properly train" the children. (R.2469.) 
L. Finding E21(h) Is Clearly Erroneous. 
B. Wilkinson did not testify that Kraatz refused to train J. 
Wilkinson and did not mention his son-in-law Jeff Gorringe at 
all. B. Wilkinson admitted that Kraatz "tried" to teach and train 
B. Wilkinson's children, but complained that Kraatz "just didn't 
get the job done" or, alternatively, that, "It just did not 
happen." (R.1877, 2041.) B. Wilkinson twice stated that he fired 
Kraatz for Kraatz's alleged "inability"—not "refusal"-train B. 
Wilkinson's children. (R.1877, lines 6-7; 1978; 2035, line 6.) 
Finding E21(h) that B. Wilkinson testified that Kraatz "refused" 
to train his children is simply not supported by the very 
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testimony to which it refers and there is no other evidence in 
the record to support the Finding. 
2. Heritage Failed To Produce Any Evidence At Trial Of Any 
Training Curriculum Required By American Honda Or That 
American Honda Ever Found Any Of The Children To Be 
Unacceptable As Managers or Dealers. 
No specific training curriculum is described or referred to 
in the Agreement. (App. B—Exh. 3 8.) The standard set forth in the 
Agreement was that the training Kraatz provided would enable 
"persons selected by [Heritage Imports] . . . to become qualified 
dealers gr_ managers acceptable to American Honda, Inc." (App. B— 
Exh. 38, fl.2(b).)(Emphasis added.) No minimum time within which 
this goal was to be accomplished was specified in the Agreement 
and no guarantee of success was made by Kraatz. (App. B—Exh. 3 8.) 
During Kraatz's employment, B. Wilkinson's children and his 
son-in-law, Jeff Gorringe, were employed at the Dealership under 
Kraatz's supervision J. Wilkinson, Matt Wilkinson and Jeff 
Gorringe were all employed in managerial positions. (R.1783-84, 
1793, 1811-12, 1824.) There was no allegation, let alone 
evidence, that any of B. Wilkinson's children were ever found to 
be unacceptable managers by American Honda. 
During Kraatz's employment there was no attempt made to have 
American Honda accept any of the children as a dealer. (R.1794.) 
In fact, a few days after Kraatz was terminated as General 
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Manager, J. Wilkinson became president and chief operating 
officer of Heritage without objection by American Honda. (App. B— 
Exh. 5.) Heritage failed at trial to establish an American Honda 
standard or curriculum for training and compare the training 
Kraatz provided to that standard. 
3. Finding E16 And The Trial Court's Oral Findings Are 
Clearly Erroneous And Insufficient As Cause For 
Kraatz's Discharge. 
Finding E16, that "The testimony of B. Wilkinson and J. 
Wilkinson is uncontroverted that Plaintiff failed to train J. 
Wilkinson to become a qualified dealer or manager acceptable to 
American Honda," is clearly erroneous as an inaccurate 
observation of the witnesses' testimonies. 
Neither B. Wilkinson nor J. Wilkinson even referred to an 
American Honda standard in their testimonies. J. Wilkinson 
testified that he never received any training from Kraatz "to be 
in the F & I Department" (R.2380) and that he was never moved to 
the position of office manager, parts manager or service manager 
and received "no training at any of those areas" (R.2381) during 
Kraatz's employment. There was, however, no testimony or evidence 
presented to establish any American Honda standard that would 
make it mandatory that J. Wilkinson be moved to all or any of 
those positions within the first 27 months of Kraatz's five year 
-46-
contract, or that whatever training J. Wilkinson received was 
unacceptable to American Honda. 
The Finding is also insufficient as cause for Kraatz's 
discharge because it recites merely that Kraatz "failed," not 
that he "refused." There could be many reasons for Kraatz's 
alleged failure, including his students' attitudes and aptitudes, 
which have nothing to do with the terms of Kraatz's employment. 
The trial court's oral Finding that Kraatz "failed to 
properly train the owner's children" (R.2469) is also 
insufficient as cause for Kraatz's discharge and is clearly 
erroneous for lack of evidence pertaining to the applicable 
standards, i.e., "refusal" and American Honda'^ standards for 
proper training. 
4. Finding E6 Is Clearly Erroneous And Insufficient As 
Cause For Kraatz's Discharge. 
Finding E6 that "J. Wilkinson testified he received no 
training while in F & I" is clearly erroneous and a 
mischaracterization of J. Wilkinson's actual testimony, which was 
as follows: 





J. Wilkinson was never asked if he received training while 
in the F & I Department or if he received training in the F & I 
Department from anyone besides Kraatz. He admitted, however, he 
was moved to the F & I Department by Kraatz for the purpose of 
"learning that department." (R.2358 lines 4-9.) 
The Agreement did not require that Kraatz personally teach 
each aspect of the automobile dealership to the children, but 
only that he "provide management training to persons selected by 
Company to enable said persons to become qualified dealers or 
managers acceptable to American Honda, Inc." (App. B—Exh. 3 8.) 
There was no testimony that American Honda required J. Wilkinson 
to receive training to be in the F & I Department before he would 
be acceptable to it as a manager. He was already a "manager" and 
there was no evidence of any complaints from American Honda. 
5. Finding E5 Is Clearly Erroneous And Insufficient As 
Cause for Kraatz#s Discharge. 
Finding E5 that "the only attempt during his 27-month tenure 
that Plaintiff made to train either J. Wilkinson or Jeff Gorringe 
was to place J. Wilkinson in financing and insurance (F & I)" is 
clearly erroneous based upon the clear weight of evidence. 
The evidence in support of Finding E5 is Kraatz's testimony 
that J. Wilkinson's transfer to the F & I Department was an 
attempt to train him. (R.1811.) There was no testimony to support 
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the portion of Finding E5 that "at no time did Plaintiff give 
instruction to J. Wilkinson on the hiring, or firing of 
personnel, or management of assets, or employee interviewing or 
other aspects of general management." Furthermore, there was no 
testimony from any witness that these aspects of a hypothetical 
training program were either required by American Honda or not 
provided by Kraatz. 
As a counterweight to the evidence supporting Finding E5, B. 
Wilkinson testified that "under the charge of teaching my kids to 
be dealers, that some of those things [scheduling of other 
employees] were delegated" to his children by Kraatz. (R.1940.) 
In this regard, Kraatz reviewed work schedules prepared by the 
managers, including J. Wilkinson, to ensure adequate coverage and 
otherwise approve the schedules. (R.1819-20.) 
Kraatz conferred with B. Wilkinson about training the 
children and together they decided to hire Chuck Quinn, a "fairly 
proven performer," to teach the "kids how to get more involved in 
a sales operation." (R.1820.) On occasion, Kraatz disciplined J. 
Wilkinson for improper conduct on the job. (R.1813, 1820-22.) 
Kraatz gave J. Wilkinson written instructions regarding 
management of dealership assets, which directed J. Wilkinson to 
"maintain a 45-day supply of vehicles" and "control overage 
inventory ensuring that no vehicle is in stock over 90 days." 
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(App. B-Exhs. 14 & 18, R. 2375-76.) Finding E5 is inconsistent 
with the unrefuted evidence that J. Wilkinson was instructed 
regarding vehicle inventory levels and ages. 
Kraatz also gave J. Wilkinson the opportunity to ^conduct 
sales meetings," assist the General Sales Manager in "motivating 
and training sales people," "organize display for new vehicle lot 
and showroom," and "provide up-to-date inventory control to 
maintain adequate model mix." (App. B-Exhs. 14 & 18; R.2375-76.) 
Finding E5 is clearly erroneous as contrary to the clear 
weight of the evidence and should be stricken. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS REGARDING KRAATZ'S CONTROL OF THE 
DEALERSHIP ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
1. Finding B13 And Conclusion El Are Clearly Erroneous. 
The trial court's finding B13 that "Plaintiff, as General 
Manager, had control over all aspects of the operation and 
function of the dealership" and Conclusion El that "Plaintiff had 
ultimate control over the financing of the dealership" (R.1713) 
are also clearly erroneous. 
The only evidence possibly supporting the Finding and 
Conclusion is: (1) the testimony of D. Hartmann to the effect 
that, as the Comerica loan officer in charge of Heritage's loans, 
he had little contact with B. Wilkinson for the first six months 
of Kraatz's employment at Heritage, and that both Kraatz and B. 
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Wilkinson stated to him that Kraatz was in complete control 
(R.2044-45, 2052-53, 2059); (2) the testimony of Mark Schmitz, 
Ph.D. ("Schmitz") that General Managers make advertising 
decisions (Finding E, R.1690); (3) Miller's testimony that Kraatz 
could have managed cash flow better (R.1691, 2081-82); (4) B. 
Wilkinson's testimony that he stated to Kraatz before Kraatz was 
hired that B. Wilkinson intended to remove himself from day-to-
day involvement with the Dealership (R.2010, 2024); and (5) 
Kraatz's Agreement, which promises Kraatz control. (App. B—Exh. 
3 8.) The foregoing is all the evidence adduced at trial to support 
Finding B13 or Conclusion El. 
This evidence must be weighed against the evidence, 
including B. Wilkinson's admissions on cross examination, that B. 
Wilkinson retained control over important aspects of the 
Dealership's expenditures, such as the salary of Heritage's 
controller Helen Green, B. Wilkinson's own compensation, employee 
benefits, legal expenses, including personal legal expenses 
related to B. Wilkinson's divorce, B. Wilkinson's personal life 
insurance premiums, B. Wilkinson's country club, entertainment 
and travel expenses, and interest-free "loans" to B. Wilkinson. 
(R.1890, 1901-03, 1932-33, 1998-2000, 2164-71, 2182, 2255-58, 
2261-62; App. B-Exhs. 235, & 329 at tab 2 and tab 3.) 
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B. Wilkinson further admitted that he retained control over 
advertising for the Dealership either because he had agreed to 
"help" Kraatz with advertising, or because he was the dealer and 
had "complete control over everything." (R.1932.) J. Wilkinson 
also testified that all advertising expenditures were directed by 
B. Wilkinson. (R.2375, App. B-Exhs. 14, 18.) 
D. Hartmann's testimony does not speak to Kraatz's control 
in the months and years after Kraatz's first six months of 
employment. Neither do B. Wilkinson's statements of his early 
intent nor the general statements of Schmitz and Miller show that 
Kraatz actually controlled the specific and important aspects of 
the dealership B. Wilkinson admitted he controlled. 
Consistent with the heavy burden placed upon Kraatz to show 
that Finding B13 is "clearly erroneous," Kraatz has scoured the 
record and marshaled all of the evidence both in favor of and 
against the Finding. Finding B13 and Conclusion El are clearly 
erroneous given the admissions of B. Wilkinson, the unrebutted 
testimony of Schmitz that B. Wilkinson's uncontrollable spending 
amounted to several hundred thousand dollars per year (R.2255-58, 
App. B-Exhs. 235 and 329 at tab 2 and tab 3 of the exhibit), and 
Miller's concession that B. Wilkinson's spending was "a 
significant amount of money on a monthly basis." (R.2071.) 
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F. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING REGARDING PURPORTED COMPLAINTS 
FROM CUSTOMERS IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND IS INSUFFICIENT AS 
CAUSE FOR KRAATZ'S DISCHARGE. 
1. Finding E21(k) Is Clearly Erroneous, 
Finding E21 (k) that B. Wilkinson testified he fired 
plaintiff for the following reasons: " (k) customers' complaints 
that they could not get customer satisfaction through customer 
relations and that the General Manager would not talk to them" is 
clearly erroneous. B. Wilkinson's actual testimony was that he 
fired Kraatz because of "claims from some customers that they 
couldn't get customer satisfaction through customer relations or 
that the General Manager wouldn't talk to them." (R.2034.) 
There was no evidence (a) that Kraatz had ever actually 
refused to address a legitimate complaint from a customer; (b) 
that it was an industry standard for the General Manager to 
address and resolve all customer complaints (as opposed to the 
customer relations department, the General Sales Manager or a 
Sales Manager); (c) when any such complaint occurred; or (d) how 
many or how often such complaints occurred. Appropriately, the 
trial court made no finding that Kraatz had refused to perform a 
duty to respond appropriately to customer complaints. 
B. Wilkinson's vague and conclusory testimony is 
insufficient to establish that Kraatz possessed a "positive and 
unequivocal intent" not to render a promised performance. B. 
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Wilkinson's testimony does not show a "willful and substantial" 
breach of the Agreement. 
G. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORAL FINDING THAT KRAATZ "UNILATERALLY 
SWITCHED BANKS'7 IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND IS INSUFFICIENT AS 
CAUSE FOR KRAATZ'S DISCHARGE. 
The evidence regarding the switch from Comerica to Key Bank 
of Heritage's new and used flooring credit lines is comprised of 
B. Wilkinson's direct testimony (R.2035, 2037-40) and cross 
examination (R.1955-73), including B. Wilkinson's deposition 
testimony, which was read into the record (R.1960-65), Hartmann's 
direct and cross examination (R.2045-46, 2049-54, 2058-62), and 
App. B—Exh. 501. In all of this testimony, neither B. Wilkinson 
nor Hartmann ever accused Kraatz of "unilaterally switching 
banks." (R.2469.) B. Wilkinson did testify that Kraatz made the 
decision to change the flooring from Comerica to Key Bank 
(R.1972, 2035, 2040) and Hartmann testified that he had dealt 
mainly with Kraatz regarding the flooring. (R.2053.) 
However, on cross-examination, B. Wilkinson admitted that he 
had started a substantial competing banking relationship with Key 
Bank prior to Kraatz's employment; that he "agreed with" Kraatz's 
desire to "get stronger in the used car business" and to "get a 
stronger used car line"; that "we asked from Key Bank two million 
instead of an $800,000.00 used car line"; that he and Kraatz had 
discussed the need for used car flooring with Comerica; that he 
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did not foresee the difficulties that arose with Comerica because 
of the Key Bank flooring; that he himself communicated to 
Comerica Heritage's intention to obtain financing from other 
banks; and that only he could execute the documents required to 
switch the flooring lines from Comerica to Key Bank. (App. B—Exh. 
266; R.1956-66.) Further, Hartmann testified that B. Wilkinson 
personally refused Comerica's offer to supply limited used car 
flooring and did most of the talking at a meeting regarding the 
flooring in January of 1991. (R.2051-53.) 
There is no evidence that Kraatz "unilaterally" switched 
banks, nor that the "switch" was a "refusal" by Kraatz to perform 
his duties as General Manager or a "willful and substantial" 
breach of Kraatz's duties. The unforeseen negative consequences 
of the switch are irrelevant. 
The great weight of the evidence is that Kraatz consulted B. 
Wilkinson regarding the "switch" from Comerica to Key Bank, that 
B. Wilkinson agreed with Kraatz's decision, and that it was B. 
Wilkinson who had final authority to implement the switch. By 
approving Kraatz's decision to change the flooring, B. Wilkinson 
waived any right he might have had to terminate Kraatz's 
employment based on that decision. See Bautch v. Red Owl Stores, 
Inc., 278 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn. 1979)(employer's condonation of 
even wrongful conduct may cause employer to waive right to 
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discharge employee); Denberg v. Loretto Heights College, 649 P.2d 
375, 377 (Colo. App. 1984). 
H. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS E17 AND E21(c) REGARDING COMPANY 
MORALE ARE INSUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR TERMINATION OF KRAATZ'S 
EMPLOYMENT. 
The trial court's written Findings E17 and E21(c) and the 
trial court's oral finding that "morale problems were created as 
the plaintiff was unable to bring together the so-called 
management team" (R.2469) are insufficient as cause for Kraatz's 
discharge under the standard of his Agreement. 
The "management team" referred to by the trial court was 
comprised of B. Wilkinson's children and in-law, who disliked 
Kraatz, resented Kraatz's position of authority in the 
dealership, and wanted Kraatz's employment terminated so that 
they could take over. (R.1927, 1940-41, 2157, 2160, 2352, 2372-
73, App. B-Exh. 31.) While the testimony revealed that B. 
Wilkinson's children defied Kraatz's authority and went over 
Kraatz's head to B. Wilkinson (R.2351-54, 2357, 2362-63, 2365-
66), there was no evidence of any attempt by B. Wilkinson to 
support Kraatz's authority in the Dealership in the eyes of his 
family. In fact, B. Wilkinson approved of his family's special 
access to him on business matters because of their status of 
"being family and all." (R.1936.) 
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The only other evidence regarding employee morale was the 
testimony of Pat Nichols, who testified that before Kraatz was 
hired, his morale was good and that while Kraatz was employed, 
his morale went down. (R.1693, 2407-11.) However, he did not 
attribute the decline in his morale to Kraatz, nor did he testify 
that any other employee's morale declined. {Id.) 
There was no evidence presented by Defendants that the 
alleged morale problem was due to any "willful and substantial" 
breach by Kraatz of his Agreement, or any "refusal" by Kraatz to 
perform his obligations. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORAL FINDING REGARDING NET WORTH AND 
PROFITABILITY AND WRITTEN FINDING El REGARDING PROFITABILITY 
ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND ARE INSUFFICIENT AS CAUSE FOR 
KRAATZ7S DISCHARGE. 
The trial court's oral finding that "the corporate net worth 
declined to approximately one-half from June 1 of '90 to August 
of '92" (R.2470) is supported only by B. Wilkinson's testimony 
that "the net worth of the dealership in total, as I remember, 
was reduced almost in half from June first of '90 until August of 
'92." (R.2035-36.) The documentary evidence admitted at trial 
demonstrates that B. Wilkinson's memory was grossly inaccurate. 
The financial statements, which both parties offered into 
evidence, show that on May 31, 1990, the Dealership's net worth 
was $908,790.00 (R.2323-24; App. B-Exh. 295, bates number 000069 
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line 62). On August 31, 1992, the net worth was $737,681.00 (App. 
B-Exh. 297, bates no. 000185 line 63), for a decline of only 
18.83%—not "approximately one-half." The entire $171,109.00 
decline was experienced in 1990, the first year of Kraatz's 
employment. In that year, the Dealership lost $295,515.00, 
$251,222.00 of which was realized after Kraatz was employed. 
(App. B—Exh. 295 May and December financial statements, bates no. 
000069 and 0000101.) From December 1990 until the time Kraatz was 
discharged, the Dealership's financial condition slowly improved. 
The trial court's reliance on B. Wilkinson's oral testimony, 
as opposed to the financial statements, was clear error, 
especially in light of the fact that the court relied on the 
financial statements to make other written findings. {See 
Findings El and J10.) 
In Finding El, the trial court found that: "The dealership 
was not profitable during the 27 months Plaintiff was general 
manager. (App. B-Exhs. 208 and 333) In 1990, it lost $295,515.00/ 
in 1991, it realized a profit of only $5,169.00, and in 1992, it 
lost $124,980.00." The court made no finding of the profit or 
loss through August 1992, the last month of Kraatz's employment; 
however, the financial statements show a cumulative net profit of 
$74,542.00 for the year through August 1992. (App. B-Exh. 2 97, 
bates no. 185 line 62.) The trial court's Finding El that the 
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Dealership was "not profitable" is therefore supportable only if 
taken as a subjective conclusion equivalent to "insufficiently 
profitable," since the court did find that the Dealership made a 
small profit in 1991 and the financial statements show a profit 
for 1992 prior to the time Kraatz was fired. 
The findings regarding profitability are irrelevant because 
the definition of "cause" in Kraatz's Agreement does not include 
lack of profitability. Lack of profitability does not indicate a 
"willful and substantial" breach by Kraatz to *do his duty, nor 
does it show a "refusal." B. Wilkinson admitted that Kraatz 
"tried to operate the store in a profitable fashion" (R.2001), 
that profitability was important to Kraatz while he was employed 
(R.2029), and that B. Wilkinson himself took some responsibility 
for the losses in 1990 and 1992. (R.2031, 2000.) 
The trial court's findings regarding profitability should be 
stricken as clearly erroneous and irrelevant. If the losses 
sustained in 1990 ever were "cause" to discharge Kraatz, Heritage 
condoned the loss by not firing Kraatz at that time and thus 
waived its right to discharge Kraatz twenty months later in 
September 1992. Denberg, supra. 
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J. FINDING E2 5 REGARDING KRAATZ'S ALLEGED GENERAL FAILURE TO 
PERFORM IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND INSUFFICIENT AS CAUSE FOR 
KRAATZ'S DISCHARGE. 
The court's Finding E25 that "plaintiff failed to perform 
his duties and responsibilities as provided under the agreement" 
(R.1695) is a clearly erroneous ultimate conclusion of fact based 
upon the court's other clearly erroneous factual Findings. 
Alternatively, the Finding is legally insufficient to justify 
Kraatz's discharge since "failure" is not the same as "refusal." 
K. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING E18 THAT KRAATZ AGREED TO RESIGN 
IS CONTRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The only testimony on this point was from Kraatz and B. 
Wilkinson. (R.1771-72, 1876.) Although B. Wilkinson testified 
that Kraatz agreed to leave the Dealership if B. Wilkinson wished 
him to leave (R.1772), the undisputed evidence is that B. 
Wilkinson sent Kraatz a letter of termination (App. B—Exh. 64) 
and that Kraatz did not submit a resignation. 
There was no affirmative defense of resignation or waiver 
raised by the Defendants in their Answer, nor was there argument 
at trial that Kraatz had agreed to resign and had therefore 
waived his claims. The court seemed to recognize this in its oral 
findings wherein the court stated "Bryan Wilkinson sent a letter 
of termination, App. B—Exh. 64, at the plaintiff's request." 
(R.2470.) That portion of Finding E18 stating that "Plaintiff 
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agreed [to resign]," is beyond any allegation or defense asserted 
at trial and contrary to the great weight of evidence. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD KRAATZ 
AMOUNTS DUE HIM EVEN IF HE WAS PROPERLY TERMINATED 
During Kraatz's employment he earned, but has not received, 
$7,734.26 for unreimbursed medical expenses and 27 months of 
vesting of stock appreciation rights. Kraatz was entitled to be 
reimbursed $5,000.00 per year in uncovered medical expenses 
(R.1837-38; App. B-Exh. 38, Schedule "A" 1 [f]). Kraatz's 
accountant's uncontroverted testimony showed that Kraatz had 
expended $7,734.26 in reimbursable medical expenses during his 
employment. (R.2118, App. B—Exh. 3 02.) The trial court ignored 
this evidence in denying Kraatz all relief. 
Kraatz's vesting of stock appreciation rights is set forth 
in Schedule B of the Agreement, which provides: 
If Employee terminates his employment or is terminated 
for cause, his stock appreciation rights shall vest 
pursuant to the following formula: 
Time Amount Vested 
Prior to June 1, 1991 20% 
6-2-91 to 6-1-92 40% 
6-2-92 to 6-1-93 60% 
6-2-93 to 6-1-94 80% 
After 6-1-94 100% 
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Under the Agreement, Kraatz was entitled to receive at least 
60% of 15% of the value of the Dealership over $2,500,000, even 
if his discharge were for cause. Substantial evidence regarding 
the value of the Dealership was presented at trial (R.2205-06, 
R.2235-37), but the court failed to address the issue of such 
value. The trial court erred by failing to award Kraatz his 
reimbursable medical expenses of $7,734.26, plus the value of his 
vested stock appreciation rights. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF 
The trial court's ruling that Kraatz has no cause of action 
for wrongful termination is fundamentally flawed because the 
court (1) failed to place on Heritage the burden to justify 
Kraatz's discharge by showing a "willful and substantial breach" 
or "refusal" by Kraatz to do his duty, (2) misinterpreted the 
terms of the parties contract by broadening the permissible 
causes for discharge, and (3) made many clearly erroneous 
findings of fact which were supported, if at all, only by vague 
and conclusory oral testimony which, as a matter of law, is 
insufficient to satisfy Heritage's burden to justify Kraatz's 
discharge. 
Properly interpreted, the Agreement narrowly restricts 
Heritage's right to discharge Kraatz. Heritage failed to produce 
any evidence of "refusal" or "dishonesty" to justify Kraatz's 
discharge. Heritage further failed to produce evidence of 
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applicable Honda and industry standards of performance in support 
of the accusations against Kraatz and instead based their 
criticisms on B. Wilkinson's subjective beliefs and feelings. 
Heritage failed to follow its corporate policy of progressive 
discipline before discharging Kraatz. The great weight of the 
evidence, including B. Wilkinson's admissions that Kraatz (a) 
tried to operate the Dealership profitably, (b) was an honest 
man, (c) tried to teach B. Wilkinson's children, and (d) was not 
expected by B. Wilkinson to work every Saturday as scheduled by 
J. Wilkinson, demonstrates that Kraatz was not guilty of a 
willful and substantial breach of his Agreement. 
The ulterior motives of Heritage and the Wilkinsons to 
invent a "cause" to discharge Kraatz in order to deprive him of 
stock appreciation rights and to promote J. Wilkinson as chief 
operating officer over the Dealership are clear. When properly 
interpreted, the Agreement protects Kraatz from such motives. 
This Court should strike those findings which are clearly 
erroneous, make its own finding that Heritage failed to meet his 
burden to justify Kraatz's discharge and remand this case with 
instructions to the trial court to enter judgment for Kraatz and 
to enter findings and judgment determining the amount of damages 
and attorney's fees necessary to compensate Kraatz for Heritage's 
breach of the Agreement. 
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In the alternative, this case should be remanded with 
instructions to award Kraatz a money judgment for health benefits 
and stock appreciation rights vested prior to Kraatz's discharge. 
DATED this A 
<L 
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JARDINE LINEBAUGH & DUNN 
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